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FEB 14 1994

February 14, 1994

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

William F. Caton, Acting Secretary  
Federal Communications Commission  
1919 M Street, N.W. - Room 222  
Washington, D.C. 20554

Re: PP Docket No. 93-253, Competitive Bidding

Dear Mr. Caton:

On February 14, 1994, Jim Tuthill of Pacific Bell, Professor Paul Milgrom of Cornerstone Research and Stanford University and the undersigned met with Diane Cornell of Chairman Hundt's Office and Rudy Baca of Commissioner Quello's office regarding issues in the subject proceeding. We distributed the attached written material.

I am filing two copies of this letter and its attachment in accordance with Section 1.1206(a) of the Commission's rules. Please contact me if you have any questions concerning this matter.

Sincerely,



Attachment

CC: Diane Cornell  
Rudy Baca  
Evan Kwerel

No. of Copies rec'd  
List ABCDE

041

# Personal Communications Services



Bringing Mobility to the Mass Market

February 14, 1994

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

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
## **AUCTION RULES SHOULD BE FAIR TO EVERYONE AND PROMOTE THE EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF LICENSES FOR SPECTRUM.**

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**The Milgrom-Wilson simultaneous bidding design is best because it:**

- **Provides equal treatment of all bidders of all sizes and in all regions**
  - **Allows bidders to base bids on estimated prices of *all* licenses and to execute backup strategies**
  - **Avoids the proven biases of sequential-combinatorial bidding**
    - **bias in favor of national combinations**
    - **bias in favor of bidders for first licenses sold**
  - **Avoids the proven inefficiencies of sequential auctions**
  - **Is practical to implement with existing technology**
-

FIGURE 1




West		East		Nation = West + East	
<u>Regional Bidder</u>	<u>Maximum Willing to Pay</u>	<u>Regional Bidder</u>	<u>Maximum Willing to Pay</u>	<u>National Bidder</u>	<u>Maximum Willing to Pay</u>
W1	20	E1	20	N1	35
W2	10	E2	10	N2	32

### LIKELY FINAL BIDS IN AUCTIONS

Oral					Sealed Bid	
	<u>West</u>		<u>East</u>	<u>Sum of Bids</u>	<u>Nation</u>	
W1	10.1	E1	10.1	20.2	N1	32.1
W2	Lose	E2	Lose	—	N2	Lose

N1 wins the license for the entire nation since its bid of 32.1 exceeds the sum of W1's and E1's final bids of 20.2, despite the fact that N1 has a lower value for the license (35) than W1 and E1 combined (40).

FIGURE 2



West		East		Nation = West + East	
<u>Regional Bidder</u>	<u>Maximum Willing to Pay</u>	<u>Regional Bidder</u>	<u>Maximum Willing to Pay</u>	<u>National Bidder</u>	<u>Maximum Willing to Pay</u>
W1	20	E1	20	N1	45
W2	10	E2	10	N2	42

### LIKELY FINAL BIDS IN AUCTIONS

Oral					Sealed Bid	
	<u>West</u>		<u>East</u>	<u>Sum of Bids</u>		<u>Nation</u>
W1	10.1	E1	10.1	20.2	N1	42.1
W2	Lose	E2	Lose	—	N2	Lose


N1 wins the license for the entire nation since its bid of 42.1 exceeds the sum of W1's and E1's final bids of 20.2.

Since N1 is the highest-value bidder, in this case, combination bidding produces an efficient outcome.


# Sealed Bid Gives an Advantage to The Package

## Success Rates of Package Assembled vs. Individual Items


Pooled Data: Percentage of All Periods



**Price of First Items Auctioned:  
Simultaneous Is Higher  
(reflecting the high value of first units)**




**Price of the Final Items Auctioned:  
Sequential Japanese Is Higher  
(reflecting the pushing phenomena)**






012494 p# 08 : sealed bid is for package ABCDEFGHI





1000	810	480	500	640	260	180	180	630
100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	69 %	100 %	49 %

# The Simultaneous Process Has an Efficiency Edge <Efficiency by Period>


C=Collection Should Win  
I=Individual items Should Win





Source: Olson and Porter

### Revenue Generated by Auctions



## **SECONDARY MARKET TRANSACTIONS WILL FACILITATE GREATER EFFICIENCY.**

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**PACIFIC  BELL®**  
A Pacific Telesis Company


- **Free markets help to correct license misallocations**
    - **Reshuffling ownership in response to changing market estimates, technical developments and business alliances increases value**
    - **The possibility of resale reduces auction risks and leads to higher prices**
  - **The FCC should permit immediate resale of licenses following auctions or lotteries.**
-

## **THE MILGROM-WILSON DESIGN INCLUDES A DETAILED PROPOSAL FOR IMPLEMENTATION.**

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- **Electronic bidding spreadsheets is a practical means to conduct the auction**
    - **bidder spreadsheets are self-checking to verify conformance to rules**
    - **auctioneer spreadsheet is simple and adaptable**
  - **Design is also implementable for remote bidding to reduce bidder costs**
  - **Fail-safe waiver rules prevent losses due to bidder error**
  - **Activity rules ensure orderly and prompt completion of the bidding**
-

## OVERVIEW OF A SINGLE ROUND OF BIDDING USING SPREADSHEET SOFTWARE



# AMERICAN COMM. BIDDING SHEET

ACTIVITY RULE WAIVER  
REQUEST IS ENTERED  
HERE.

SOFTWARE USES  
BIDDER'S NAME TO  
IDENTIFY THE BID.

ALLOWED ACTIVITY IN  
THE NEXT ROUND IS  
CALCULATED  
AUTOMATICALLY.

BIDDING SHEET IS SELF  
CHECKING. BID CHECK  
REPORT SUMMARIZES AND  
ITEMIZES THE CHECKS  
PERFORMED.

## PCS Spectrum Auction Bidding Sheet

Bidder: American Comm.  
Waiver Request: No

Auction Phase: 1  
Multiplier: 3.0  
Activity Level: 417

### Pop/MHz Eligibility

Initial 452  
Current round 452  
Next round 452

### Waiver Used

2nd Previous No  
Previous No  
Current No

### BID CHECK REPORT

#### OVERALL

Minimum increment rule:  
Bidding eligibility:  
MHz limit rule:  
Waiver use rule:  
Activity level:  
MHz-pop eligibility

O.K.

O.K.

O.K.

O.K.

O.K.

Unchanged.

MINIMUM QUALIFYING BIDS  
ARE CALCULATED USING  
CURRENT HIGH BIDS AND THE  
MINIMUM INCREMENT RULE.

WARNING MESSAGES ARE  
PRINTED NEXT TO THOSE  
NEW BIDS THAT VIOLATE  
RULES.

										American Comm.			Warning Messages		
License	Band	Contained in MTA	Bandwidth (MHz)	POPs (thousands)	Reserve Price	Current High Bid	Identity of High Bidder	Minimum Qualifying Bid	Eligible to Bid	MHz Limit in Service Area	Current Total MHz in Service Area	New Bid	Qualifying Bid Check	Eligibility Check	MHz Limit in Service Area Check
MTA 1	A		30	3,500	\$5,250,000	\$6,400,000	Vienna Telephone	\$6,720,000	Y						
MTA 1	B		30	3,500	\$5,250,000	\$6,200,000	Microwave Tech.	\$6,510,000	Y	30	0				
MTA 2	A		30	7,800	\$11,700,000	\$16,500,000	Vienna Telephone	\$17,325,000	Y						
MTA 2	B		30	7,800	\$11,700,000	\$15,400,000	American Comm.	\$16,170,000	Y	30	30				
BTA 11	C	1	20	2,000	\$2,000,000	\$2,100,000	Telecom Ventures	\$2,205,000	N						
BTA 11	D	1	10	2,000	\$1,000,000	\$1,100,000	Ashley Telephone	\$1,155,000	N						
BTA 11	E	1	10	2,000	\$1,000,000	\$1,050,000	Vienna Telephone	\$1,102,500	Y			\$1,200,000			
BTA 11	F	1	10	2,000	\$1,000,000	\$1,025,000	Microwave Tech.	\$1,076,250	Y			\$1,100,000			
BTA 11	G	1	10	2,000	\$1,000,000	\$1,025,000	American Comm.	\$1,076,250	Y	40	30				
BTA 12	C	1	20	1,500	\$1,500,000	\$1,600,000	Telecom Ventures	\$1,680,000	N						
BTA 12	D	1	10	1,500	\$750,000	\$850,000	Ashley Telephone	\$892,500	N						
BTA 12	E	1	10	1,500	\$750,000	\$850,000	Microwave Tech.	\$892,500	Y			\$900,000			
BTA 12	F	1	10	1,500	\$750,000	\$825,000	American Comm.	\$866,250	Y						
BTA 12	G	1	10	1,500	\$750,000	\$800,000	American Comm.	\$840,000	Y	40	30				
BTA 21	C	2	20	4,000	\$4,000,000	\$4,300,000	Ashley Telephone	\$4,515,000	N						
BTA 21	D	2	10	4,000	\$2,000,000	\$2,800,000	Telecom Ventures	\$2,940,000	N						
BTA 21	E	2	10	4,000	\$2,000,000	\$2,200,000	American Comm.	\$2,310,000	Y						
BTA 21	F	2	10	4,000	\$2,000,000			\$2,000,000	Y						
BTA 21	G	2	10	4,000	\$2,000,000	\$2,750,000	Microwave Tech.	\$2,887,500	Y	40	40				
BTA 22	C	2	20	3,800	\$3,800,000	\$4,200,000	Ashley Telephone	\$4,410,000	N						
BTA 22	D	2	10	3,800	\$1,900,000			\$1,900,000	N						
BTA 22	E	2	10	3,800	\$1,900,000	\$2,300,000	American Comm.	\$2,415,000	Y						
BTA 22	F	2	10	3,800	\$1,900,000	\$2,200,000	Vienna Telephone	\$2,310,000	Y						
BTA 22	G	2	10	3,800	\$1,900,000	\$1,950,000	Microwave Tech.	\$2,047,500	Y	40	40				

AMCOMM TELEPHONE BIDS CONFORM TO RULES OF AUCTION

BANDWIDTH CURRENTLY HELD IN EACH SERVICE AREA IS CALCULATED AS FOLLOWS:

AMCOMM TELEPHONE'S NEW  
BIDS CONFORM TO THE  
RULES OF AUCTION.

BANDWIDTH CURRENTLY  
HELD IN EACH SERVICE AREA IS  
CALCULATED  
AUTOMATICALLY.

FCC'S DAILY REPORT IS USED TO  
UPDATE INFORMATION ON  
CURRENT HIGH BIDS.



# THE OFFICIAL DAILY REPORT

AUCTION PHASE REPORTED  
HERE APPLIES TO THE NEXT  
ROUND OF BIDDING.

BIDDING ROUND IS  
REPORTED ALONG  
WITH AUCTION PHASE.

HIGH BIDS AND THE  
IDENTITY OF HIGH  
BIDDER PRIOR TO THE  
LAST ROUND OF  
BIDDING.

THE OFFICIAL STATUS REPORT  
SPECIFIES FOR EACH LICENSE THE  
NUMBER OF QUALIFYING BIDS  
RECEIVED IN THE LAST ROUND, THE  
AMOUNT OF THE CURRENT HIGH  
BID AND THE IDENTITY OF THE  
CURRENT HIGH BIDDER.

## PCS Spectrum Auction Status Report for Feb 11, 1994

Bidding round: 6  
Auction phase: 1

FIRST SIX COLUMNS  
CONTAIN THE ESSENTIAL  
INFORMATION ABOUT THE  
LICENSES.

License	Band	Contained in MTA	Bandwidth (MHz)	POPs (thousands)	Reserve Price	Prior High Bid	Prior High Bidder	NUMBER OF QUALIFYING BIDS	CURRENT HIGH BID	CURRENT HIGH BIDDER
MTA 1	A		30	3,500	\$5,250,000	\$6,400,000	Vienna Telephone	0	\$6,400,000	Vienna Telephone
MTA 1	B		30	3,500	\$5,250,000	\$6,200,000	Microwave Tech.	1	\$6,600,000	Ashley Telephone
MTA 2	A		30	7,800	\$11,700,000	\$16,500,000	Vienna Telephone	0	\$16,500,000	Vienna Telephone
MTA 2	B		30	7,800	\$11,700,000	\$15,400,000	American Comm.	0	\$15,400,000	American Comm.
BTA 11	C	1	20	2,000	\$2,000,000	\$2,100,000	Telecom Ventures	0	\$2,100,000	Telecom Ventures
BTA 11	D	1	10	2,000	\$1,000,000	\$1,100,000	Ashley Telephone	1	\$1,155,000	Telecom Ventures
BTA 11	E	1	10	2,000	\$1,000,000	\$1,050,000	Vienna Telephone	1	\$1,200,000	American Comm.
BTA 11	F	1	10	2,000	\$1,000,000	\$1,025,000	Microwave Tech.	2	\$1,100,000	American Comm.
BTA 11	G	1	10	2,000	\$1,000,000	\$1,025,000	American Comm.	0	\$1,025,000	American Comm.
BTA 12	C	1	20	1,500	\$1,500,000	\$1,600,000	Telecom Ventures	0	\$1,600,000	Telecom Ventures
BTA 12	D	1	10	1,500	\$750,000	\$850,000	Ashley Telephone	1	\$895,000	Telecom Ventures
BTA 12	E	1	10	1,500	\$750,000	\$850,000	Microwave Tech.	2	\$900,000	American Comm.
BTA 12	F	1	10	1,500	\$750,000	\$825,000	American Comm.	0	\$825,000	American Comm.
BTA 12	G	1	10	1,500	\$750,000	\$800,000	American Comm.	0	\$800,000	American Comm.
BTA 21	C	2	20	4,000	\$4,000,000	\$4,300,000	Ashley Telephone	1	\$4,515,000	Telecom Ventures
BTA 21	D	2	10	4,000	\$2,000,000	\$2,800,000	Telecom Ventures	0	\$2,800,000	Telecom Ventures
BTA 21	E	2	10	4,000	\$2,000,000	\$2,200,000	American Comm.	0	\$2,200,000	American Comm.
BTA 21	F	2	10	4,000	\$2,000,000	\$2,800,000	Ashley Telephone	2	\$2,850,000	Ashley Telephone
BTA 21	G	2	10	4,000	\$2,000,000	\$2,750,000	Microwave Tech.	0	\$2,750,000	Microwave Tech.
BTA 22	C	2	20	3,800	\$3,800,000	\$4,200,000	Ashley Telephone	1	\$4,410,000	Telecom Ventures
BTA 22	D	2	10	3,800	\$1,900,000	\$1,900,000	Ashley Telephone	1	\$1,900,000	Ashley Telephone
BTA 22	E	2	10	3,800	\$1,900,000	\$2,300,000	American Comm.	0	\$2,300,000	American Comm.
BTA 22	F	2	10	3,800	\$1,900,000	\$2,200,000	Vienna Telephone	0	\$2,200,000	Vienna Telephone
BTA 22	G	2	10	3,800	\$1,900,000	\$1,950,000	Microwave Tech.	0	\$1,950,000	Microwave Tech.

LICENSES WHOSE HIGH  
BIDS INCREASED IN THE  
LAST ROUND ARE  
SHADED.

# FCC's MAIN SHEET

